Abstract-In this paper, we investigate twisted Gabidulin codes in the GPT code-based public-key cryptosystem. We show that Overbeck's attack is not feasible for a subfamily of twisted Gabidulin codes. The resulting key sizes are significantly lower than in the original McEliece system and also slightly smaller than in Loidreau's unbroken GPT variant.
vector space over F q and that elements of F q m can be uniquely represented in a fixed basis of F q m over F q . Hence, we can represent a vector c ∈ F n q m of length n as an m × n matrix C ∈ F m×n q by expanding the entries of c column-wise. The rank rank(c) of a vector c ∈ F q m is defined by the rank of its matrix representation.
A. Rank-Metric Codes
The rank metric is defined by
It can be shown that the rank metric is indeed a metric. A linear rank-metric code of length n, dimension k and minimum (rank) distance d over F q m , denoted by C or C[n, k], is a kdimensional subspace of F n q m , which fulfills d = min c1,c2∈C c1 =c2
The rank-metric Singleton bound states that the minimum distance of such a code with n ≤ m is upper-bounded by d ≤ n − k + 1. If a code fulfills this upper bound with equality, then it is called maximum rank distance (MRD) code.
B. Linearized Polynomials
Linearized polynomials were first studied in [32] . They are polynomials of the form f = i f i x q i , where f i ∈ F q m and f i = 0 for finitely many i. For notational convenience, we define [i] := q i , so we write f = i f i x [i] . The q-degree of f is defined by
The evaluation map f (·) :
is F q -linear. Using ordinary addition and composition of polynomials as multiplication, linearized polynomials form a (non-commutative) ring, which we denote by L q m .
C. Gabidulin Codes
Gabidulin codes are MRD codes that were independently introduced in [1] - [3] . They are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Gabidulin code [1] - [3] ) Let α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F q m be linearly independent over F q and k < n. The corresponding [n, k] Gabidulin code is defined by
D. Sum Operator
Definition 2 (q-Sum) Let C[n, k] be a linear code over F q m and i ∈ N 0 . Then, the (i th ) q-sum of C is defined by
It is well-known that a random code fulfills with high probability and that a Gabidulin code satisfies
Hence, for k < n − i, a Gabidulin code has smaller q-sum dimension than a random code with high probability. This observation was used in [24] , [25] to obtain a distinguisher and an attack on the GPT cryptosystem. We will also use the q-sum operator for matrices.
Definition 3 (q-Sum) Let A ∈ F s×n q and i ∈ N 0 . Then, the (i th ) q-sum of A is defined by
. . .
If G is a generator matrix of a code C, then Λ i (G) is a generator matrix of Λ i (C).
A. The GPT Crpytosystem and Its Variants
The GPT cryptosystem is an instantiation of the McEliece cryptosystem with Gabidulin codes. In this paper, we study the most general form of the GPT cryptosystem, cf. [33] .
Key Generation: Let G be the k × n generator matrix of an [n, k] Gabidulin code, S a random full-rank k × k matrix over F q m , X a random matrix of size k × λ over F q m of rank 1 ≤ s ≤ λ and P a random (n + λ) × (n + λ) full-rank matrix over F q . Then, the public key of the GPT cryptosystem is defined as:
and the integers n, λ, k, t = n−k 2 . To ensure proper decoding, it is important that P lies in F q . However, this enables Overbeck's attack (see the following subsection). In [17] , [19] , variants for P were suggested where P is in F q m . However, as shown in [27] , in all of these variants, the public key can be rewritten as
where P * is in F q . Encryption: To encode a plaintext m, choose randomly a vector z ∈ F n q m of rank t and compute the ciphertext as c = mG pub + z.
Decryption: Apply the decoding algorithm corresponding to G to the last n symbols of cP −1 . Clearly rank(zP −1 ) ≤ t. This decoder therefore provides mS and by inverting S, the secret message m can be recovered.
B. Overbeck's Attack
Overbeck's attack [24] , [25] is based on two observations: i) An [n, k] Gabidulin code has a parity-check matrix of the form
where γ ∈ F n q m with linearly independent entries.
ii) There is an integer i such that
The idea is to recover a vector γ by choosing a non-zero vector in the dual code of Λ i (C).
In the following, we show that property (ii) is fulfilled for the most general form of the GPT system, the one with a public key as in (1) .
The generator matrix of the code Λ i (C pub ) is:
where
and S is a block diagonal matrix with S, S [1] , . . . ,
and there exists a vector v = (0|v ) such that Λ i (G pub )·v T = 0 and Overbeck's attack can be applied by simply using a polynomial-time decoder on the public code.
I V. T W I S T E D G A B I D U L I N C O D E S

A. Definition
Definition 4 (Twisted Gabidulin Code, [8] ) Let n, k, ∈ N with k < n and ≤ n − k. Choose a
• hook vector 1 h ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and a
• twist vector t ∈ {1, . . . , n − k} with distinct t i , and let
Let α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F q m be linearly independent over F q and write α = [α 1 , . . . , α n ]. The [α, t, h, η]-twisted Gabidulin code of length n and dimension k is given by
B. Generator Matrix of a Twisted Gabiulin Code
A generator matrix of a twisted Gabidulin code with h 1 < h 2 < · · · < h is given by:
Example 1
The following matrix is a example for the generator matrix of an [n, k] = [27, 10] twisted Gabidulin code with t = [6, 12] , h = [5, 6] , see also the illustration in Figure 1 :
α [7] α [8] α 
C. MRD Twisted Gabidulin Codes
It was shown in [8] that if the η j and the evaluation points α i are chosen in a proper way, the twisted Gabidulin code C α,t,h,η [n, k] is MRD.
Theorem 2 (Twisted Gabidulin are MRD, [8, Thm 1])
Let s 0 , . . . , s ∈ N be such that
is a chain of subfields. Choose k < n ≤ s 0 and h, t, η, α as in Definition 4 with the additional requirements α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F q s 0 , and
Then, C α,t,h,η [n, k] is MRD.
Remark 3 We can choose s i = 2 · s i−1 in Theorem 2. In this way, we obtain m = 2 s 0 ≥ 2 n.
This means that when n = s 0 , the memory required to store a generator matrix of a twisted Gabidulin code with twists is 2 times larger than the one of a Gabidulin code with the same parameters [n, k].
D. Decoding
Finding an efficient decoding algorithm for twisted Gabidulin codes is an open problem and research in progress. For the original twisted Gabidulin codes by Sheekey [4] , an efficient decoding algorithm was found in [34] , [35] . Although a generalization to the twisted codes in [8] does not appear to be straightforward, it seems likely that an efficient decoder will be found soon.
V. T W I S T E D G
In this section, we show that twisted Gabidulin codes can have larger q-sum dimension than a Gabidulin code of the same dimension would have.
Theorem 4 (Large q-Sum Dimension) Let n, k, t, h, η, α be chosen as in Definition 4 such that
For all i ∈ N, we then have
Proof:
We first prove that
is a generator matrix of the code Λ 1 (C). The proof is illustrated in Figure 2 . and α hi+1 are in C, so
are in C [1] . Hence, for any α j with j = 0, . . . , k, α j is in the code C (if we have j = h i for all i) or in C [1] (if, e.g., j = h i for some i).
Any
∈ Λ1(C)
, and similarly, we have
Since the α [i] are linearly independent for 0 ≤ i < n and there are no other possible powers of α achievable by linear combinations of elements in C and C [1] , the rows of the generator matrix G Λ1(C) are a basis of Λ 1 (C). As the matrix has k + 1 + 2 = k − 1 + 2( + 1) rows.
By the choice of the t i , the "power gaps" between α for any i = 1, . . . , − 1, and between α [k+t ] and α [n] , are exactly ∆ − 1.
If we iteratively increase the q-power of Λ i (C) to Λ i+1 (C), the new basis elements are
which are + 1 many. This process can be repeated until we have i = ∆, in which case the code
and has dimension n. This implies the claim. The iteration is illustrated in Figure 3 . . . .
where γ ∈ F n q m with linearly independent entries and j ≤ n.
Proof: The q-sums of the codes C in Theorem 4 increase by + 1 when increasing i. If any of the q-sums C i := Λ i (C) had a parity check matrix of the above form, then, by the same arguments as in [2] , C i would have a generator matrix of the form [β , β [1] , . . . , β [n−j−1] ] for some β ∈ F n q m with linearly independent entries. This would, however, imply that the first q-sum
contradicting the fact that the q-sum increases by + 1.
B. Property ii)
Theorem 6 Let C be a code defined as in Theorem 4 and let C i := Λ i (C) be its i th q-sum. Then, we have
Proof: This statement follows directly from the dimension of C i , which is given in Theorem 4.
C. An Exponential-Time Attack
By construction, any q-sum (that is not equal to F n q m ) of a code C as in Theorem 4 is a subset of a large Gabidulin code D, which is defined as follows:
Since any non-zero vector γ in the dual code of D gives a parity check matrix from which the evaluation points α can be recovered, such an γ can be found by first determining the q-sum C i of C of dimension n − ( + 1) and then searching its dual code
, such an attack has work factor
Hence, we must choose m and large enough in order to prevent this attack to be efficient.
In this Section, the security level, the rate and the keysize of the GPT cryptosystem based on twisted Gabidulin codes is compared with McEliece's cryptosystem based on Goppa codes using list decoding [36] , Loidreau's new rank-metric code-based encryption scheme [29] , [30] and the QC-MDPC cryptosystem [37] .
The considered attacks on the new GPT variant based on twisted Gabidulin codes are the syndrome decoding attacks in [11] , [13] , Gibson's attack [21] , [22] , and the exponential-time attack described in Section VI-C, cf. (5). Table I gives parameters for expected work factors of around 2 80 , 2 130 and 2 260 . The security level of the GPT system which is based on twisted Gabidulin codes is determined by the smallest work factor which is given by the decoding attack in [11] for all three cases. We observe that for all work factors McEliece has the highest rate followed by Loidreau, Twisted GPT and QC-MDPC. The results show further that although the keysizes of Twisted GPT and Loidreau are larger than the keysizes of QC-MDPC, they require much smaller key sizes compared to McEliece. Since the QC-MDPC scheme gives no guarantee that the cipher can be decrypted, the GPT cryptosystem based on twisted Gabidulin codes should be considered as an alternative of McEliece, Loidreau and QC-MDPC.
